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ABSTRACT
NOWASKEY, KEVIN R. “America and the Yuan: A Quantitative Analysis of Opinions at the
Industry Level” Department of Economics, June 2012.
Prof. Bradley Lewis (Economics); Prof. Mark Dallas (Political Science)
Since China’s emergence as a developed economy, its unconventional monetary policies have
drawn criticism from foreign trading partners. Despite pressure from Western governments, the
People’s Republic continues to maintain a policy of “pegging” the value of the Yuan to the U.S.
Dollar. A natural consequence of this has been an outcry for increased trade protectionism in the
United States. Contrary to economic intuition, however, not all industries in the United States voice
grievance against the Chinese, and some have even opposed protectionist legislation. The
economic or other reasons for this private sector divergence of opinion have remained largely
unclear. Equally unclear is whether U.S. protectionist legislation is implemented proactively or
reactively. I explore various connections to determine what drives U.S. protectionist policies and
speculate as to what factors most heavily influence opinions. I hypothesize that the primary
determinants are an industry’s exchange rate “pass-through” and its specific exchange rate relative
to the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the Yuan. To test the factors identified, I analyze
lobbying data for The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act (2010), which provides a mechanism
for entities to call for trade protectionist measures. I find that the REER of the Yuan is the primary
factor driving industry opinions on protectionism. I also find that unanimity in opinion for
protectionism is most visible at the level of “manufacturing,” while unanimity in opinion against
protectionism is most apparent at the level of “non-manufacturing.” Lastly, I find that
Congressional responsiveness via protectionist legislation is predominantly reactive.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A. Background on Exchange Rates and Foreign Trade
As most economists would agree, “the exchange rate is the most important price in any
economy, for it affects all other prices.”1 Not only does it affect prices in the domestic economy,
but a country’s exchange rate has ripple effects on the price of goods for every foreign consumer of
its products. Changes in an exchange rate can benefit some industries, harm others, change the
purchasing power of foreign citizens and governments, and thrust entire economies into turmoil.
With such dramatic potential, decisions over “appropriate” exchange rate policies affecting a
currency are inevitably heated, with segments within each side’s economy taking different sides for
different reasons, the majority of which are self-serving. Based on characteristics specific to an
industry or firm that make it more or less sensitive to changes in exchange rates, it will allocate
huge amounts of resources to promote its agenda amongst policymakers. The ongoing debate over
China’s depreciated Yuan and its forced “peg” to the U.S. Dollar is no exception to this trend.
B. Historical Background on Chinese Monetary Policy
In the years leading up to 1994, China maintained an unusual exchange rate regime. Rather
than one, universal exchange rate system, China instead had a dual system in which there were two
exchange rates for its currency. Similar to its current status, the official system was “fixed” and not
subject to a valuation float, while it separately had “a relatively market-based exchange rate system
that was used by importers and exporters in ‘swap markets,’ although access to foreign exchange
was highly restricted in order to limit imports, resulting in a large black market for foreign
exchange.”2 Rather than a purely market-based system, however, which would dictate one, acrossthe-board exchange rate, China’s system yielded two different rates. As of 1993, the official Yuan1
2
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Dollar exchange rate was 5.77, while the Yuan held a value of 8.7 against the Dollar in the swap
markets.3 At the time, many in the United States perceived such discrepancies as evidence of
foreign import limitation by China.
In 1994, the Chinese central bank modified its dual rate policy, opting to continue the
official system of “pegging” the Yuan value to that of the Dollar at an initial exchange rate of 8.70
Yuan-per-Dollar.4 The Chinese monetary authorities were able to maintain the peg through a
process of “buying (or selling) as many dollar-denominated assets in exchange for newly-printed
Yuan as needed to eliminate excess demand (supply) for the Yuan.”5 As is the case with every
commodity in the global marketplace, the “price” of a currency is dictated by the forces of supply
and demand.6 The Chinese policy of offsetting market-based changes with countermeasures
ensures that their exchange rate is insulated from both supply and demand shocks that would
otherwise change its value. While free-market intuition makes such interventionist policies seem
detrimental to economic welfare, they bear certain advantages under certain market conditions.
Particularly in an economy like China’s, which relies tremendously on export-driven growth, an
artificially-depreciated currency results in relatively lower prices for foreign consumers of
domestically produced goods. As a result, foreign demand surges, while demand for goods
produced by foreign firms declines due to static overall demand. In essence, disabling the free
market mechanism for pricing a currency heightens free market demand for goods priced in the
currency.
By contrast with the policies of global economic powers that adopted floating exchange
rate policies and allowed market forces to control inflation, China’s pegged exchange rate regime
kept the value of the Yuan at approximately 8.28 Yuan-per-Dollar from 1994 to July 2005.7 Over
the same time period, as other currencies appreciated naturally and resulted in relative increases in
3
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price levels for imported goods, the Yuan and goods valued under it remained comparatively
cheap. Such low prices relative to goods produced in foreign countries increased foreign demand
for Chinese goods, thereby boosting China’s aggregate output and rapidly expanded its macro and
micro-economy.8 The rate of economic expansion in China in recent years is much faster than that
in other modern economies, as it experienced annual growth of 10.4% from 2007 to 2009,9 despite
the global recession that slowed or even reversed the growth of other economies.
On July 21st, 2005, in light of growing pressure from the international community,
particularly its most vocal member on matters of trade, the United States, China agreed to enable
the Yuan to become adjustable based on market supply and demand as dictated by movements of
currencies in a predefined “basket.”10 The Yuan was allowed to be revalued at 8.11 Yuan-perDollar, a 2.1% appreciation from 8.28. As of July 21st, 2008, the Yuan had appreciated, albeit much
more slowly than most currencies over the same time period, to 6.83 against the Dollar under a
system referenced by some as a “managed float.”11 While this appreciation represents an increase
in value of roughly 20%, economists specializing in matters of exchange rate policy estimate that
the Yuan would need to appreciate an additional 40% to reflect its true market value.12 Since 2008,
however, as a result of the financial crisis driving down foreign demand for Chinese exports, the
Yuan was held nearly constant at 6.83 Yuan-per-Dollar until June 2010.

C. The U.S. Perspective
On September 29, 2010, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 2378, the
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act. As stated in the legislation’s text, its purpose is “to amend
title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that fundamental exchange-rate misalignment by any
foreign nation is actionable under United States countervailing and antidumping duty laws, and for
8
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other purposes.”13 While the bill’s statement of purpose leaves unspecified the country with which
it is most concerned, rhetoric on Capitol Hill and beyond overwhelmingly indicates that its
primary, if not exclusive, goal is to mitigate exchange rate “manipulation” by the People’s
Republic of China.14 According to the Library of Congress (THOMAS) summary of the bill, its
creation was motivated by the need for an explicit mechanism by which to identify foreign
currency manipulators, and provide grounds for a subsequent U.S. trade policy response to
countervail the effects of such manipulation. The summary then explains the various criteria
required for a country to be formally deemed as a currency manipulator, such as being undervalued
by a minimum of 5% in the past 18 months, substantial foreign exchange intervention by the
country’s monetary authorities in the same time period, and whether the country’s holdings of
foreign currency denominated reserves exceed its debt obligations coming due in the next year.15
Despite its intended effect of preserving American jobs and protecting export-driven American
firms, H.R. 2378 resulted in a sharp polarization in opinion between firms. The economic levels on
which opinions with respect to currency manipulation diverge, and the nature of U.S. legislative
responsiveness to manipulative practices, however, remain to be determined.
On January 13th, 2011, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner publicly criticized China
for keeping its currency “substantially undervalued,” thereby imposing “substantial costs on other
emerging markets that run more flexible exchange rates, and as a result have experienced a
substantial loss of competitiveness.”16 The U.S. Treasury, which has the final word in officially
labeling a country as a “currency manipulator,” has yet to brand China as such, despite America’s
trade deficit with the country surging from $10 billion in 1990 to $266 billion in 2008.17 Under
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intense scrutiny from several world powers, however, it appears that China may be positioning to
allow gradual appreciation of the Yuan in the near future.
On the receiving end of currency manipulation are industries and their employees in the
importing countries who don’t have the benefit of a depreciated currency, which has an effect
economically equivalent to a subsidy. In the case of the Yuan, these groups overwhelmingly
emanate from the United States. The U.S. is China’s largest international trading partner, and in
2010 had a trade deficit of $273 billion with the People’s Republic.18 Put simply, the U.S. imported
$273 billion more in goods and services from China than China imported from the United States.
This commerce imbalance is arguably the most tangible statistic explaining the calls for
protectionist measures addressing Chinese monetary policies which prevent the Yuan from
appreciating against the Dollar.
D. The Yuan and Market Distortion: The Empirical Validity of Allegations
While a thorough investigation of alternative explanations extends beyond the intent of this
project, it is imperative to acknowledge the possibility that actual causality for negative opinions
towards Chinese exchange rate policies does not lie solely, if at all, with any measure of the
exchange rate between the two countries. Rather, it may be the case that the influential determinant
is instead a factor, or a plurality of factors, which emerge as a consequence of public policy.
The overwhelming argument used to back the case for forced appreciation of the Yuan is
that which cites its undervaluation as a driving factor behind rising American unemployment. A
closer look at empirical data, however, reveals a pattern that sharply undermines this argument. A
2011 study conducted by the Heritage Foundation and the Asian Studies Center illustrates that over
the past two decades, periods of rising U.S. unemployment have coincided with discernible
appreciations of the Yuan. Conversely, during times when the American unemployment rate was

18
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steadily falling, the Yuan was simultaneously depreciating19. In other words, recent history directly
conflicts with the claim that the value of China’s currency is negatively correlated with the
American unemployment rate.
While historical trends initially appear to discredit U.S.-based arguments for protectionism
against an undervalued Yuan, a more detailed analysis reveals that blame has merely been
misdirected. It goes without saying that a wide variety of internal factors influence the value of a
country’s currency relative to major trading partners. Chief among such factors are those
originating from the realm of public policy, particularly in countries whose economy is heavily
driven by government intervention, if not outright state ownership.20 In the case of China, whose
economy is overwhelmingly export-based and maintained via mechanisms including state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), total control over industry entry/exit, strict limits on and suppression of the
growth and scale of privately-owned enterprises and the dissemination of stolen intellectual
property,21 such factors can neither be discounted nor considered independently from exchange
rates.
The People’s Republic has also been seen taking similar “far beyond permissive” measures
to boost exports, ranging from preferential access to bank loans to enhanced tax/tariff relief for
state-owned enterprises.22 Illustrating the enormity of these SOEs, which are regularly given
guaranteed revenue and domestic production subsidies, Channel News Asia reported in 2010 that
two SOE leaders in the oil and telecom industries declared profits exceeding those of the largest
500 private Chinese firms combined.23 These measures have been statistically proven to have been
“an important influence” in sustaining otherwise-impossible volumes of exports.24

19
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Given that the lopsided trade balance between China and the United States weighs heavily
on various exchange rates, notably those weighted by exports and imports, it seems probable that
excessive subsidization policies have a substantial degree of influence on the opinions of foreign
firms toward their Chinese counterparts. In his testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission on the distorting effects of Chinese subsidies on international trade,
economist Derek Scissors makes the points that these subsidies block exports to China, distort
imports from China, damage foreign firms in China, destabilize the world economy, and
simultaneously cause overinvestment and under-consumption within the country.25

E. The Political Economy of the U.S.-China Exchange Rate Impasse
The ongoing ambiguity of what accounts for negative perceptions of Chinese monetary
policy amongst the U.S. private sector is likely not a result of complexity or misinterpretation, but
is instead a likely consequence of the incomplete and intentionally-obstructed view afforded to
foreigners by Chinese policymakers. In sharp contrast to the immediate availability of economic
and public policy data in modern democracies, comparable statistics for the highly secretive
People’s Republic are sparse and partially accurate at best, while non-existent or entirely fabricated
at worst. However, this lack of transparency might afford some explanatory power in terms of
China’s decision to “peg” its currency to the Dollar; a highly-transparent policy would be
inconsistent with typically tight-lipped Chinese public policy. J. Lawrence Broz argues that “in
nations where public decision-making is opaque and unconstrained, governments must look to a
commitment technology that is more transparent and constrained (i.e., fixed exchange rates) than
the government itself.”26 Clearly, this fits the model of China’s exchange rate regime, which openly
acknowledges the extent and mechanisms used to maintain the current peg on the bilateral
USD/CHY exchange rate.
25
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Continuing with a political framework, exchange rate policy is not limited in its
implications as merely being a reflection of transparency. Recent research identifies two pressures
that act for or against coordination and cooperation in international affairs. The first of these
pressures follows that “exchange rate policies have electoral implications. The exchange rate is
such an important price that politicians may wish to manipulate it for the purpose of winning
elections, rather than stabilizing an international regime.”27 Although China’s system of
government is not nearly as transparent or democratic as other governments presiding over modern
economies, its leaders are still elected by eligible voters as representatives of the one ruling party.
This one-party regime is almost certainly the explanation behind the minimal linkage of exchange
rate policy with electoral considerations. Given an absence of policy alternatives stemming from
one-party rule, considerations afforded to voters in decision-making are limited to personal
attributes of the candidates or minor ideological discrepancies with competing candidates. The
absolute control enjoyed by the Communist party ensures that no candidate has the ability to
pursue, or even propose pursuing, a change as dramatic as instating a floating exchange rate
system. In light of this obvious barrier, considering this as a functional pressure in the context of
China would not be a relevant undertaking. However, in countries with floating exchange rate
systems influenced solely by market forces, exchange rate policy bears heavily on electoral
considerations. While the very nature of floating exchange rate systems prevents policymakers
from directly affecting the value of currency, more likely electoral considerations include stances
toward policies addressing foreign currency practices, the central bank, and international trade.28
While exchange rate policies substantially affect elections in robust, modern economies,
they do so to an even greater extent in developing countries with no clearly established monetary
policy or even those developed countries seeking to fundamentally change their exchange rate
system. In such cases, the two decisions facing policymakers are far more drastic in their

27
28
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implications. The first is the choice of regime type, which is typically the decision between
allowing the currency to float freely against others versus actively “pegging” it to some recognized,
stable currency. Recent studies have concluded that this choice is often contingent on the type of
political regime in place. Non-democracies more often opt for fixed exchange rate regimes than do
democracies, having a greater ability to do so by virtue of their greater insulation from both foreign
and domestic audiences.29 The second choice can be made only after making the first, being that of
deciding the target exchange rate in domestic and international terms. This decision is arguably
more significant than the first, as it entails the “political-economy trade-off between
competitiveness and purchasing power.”30 The rationale behind these options will be discussed in
greater detail throughout subsequent sections, but it goes without saying that these are of utmost
importance to the citizens of every country and are thus carefully considered by political
candidates.
This second pressure is described by noting that “exchange rate policies involve trade-offs
with the domestic distributional implications.”31 In the case of China, these implications have been
sharply pronounced in the form of domestic under-consumption and overinvestment. While a
depreciated Yuan encourages foreign consumption of Chinese goods, which are made cheaper by
depreciation, it acts conversely on the prices of domestic goods. Put simply, in order to maintain an
export-based, exchange-rate fueled economy, Chinese citizens have to dole out more Yuan for
domestic purchases than they would otherwise. Despite this burden on its citizens, Chinese
policymakers have likely weighed their alternatives and concluded that the foreign trade
advantages yielded by the currency peg outweigh the consequences of having a warped distribution
of domestic goods. Regardless of exchange rate type, though, “export and import competing
industries lose and domestically oriented (non-tradeables) industries gain from currency

29
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appreciation.”32 Bearing this in mind, policymakers are reasonably able to predict the distributional
effects of a particular policy seeking to appreciate or depreciate a currency, thereby realizing the
subsequent political repercussions that will consequently work either for or against them in terms
of electability.
While such political economy considerations are worthy of future research and discussion,
they are only relevant for purposes of this project to the extent that they bear on private sector
opinions and legislative responsiveness in the context of foreign exchange.
F. Divergence in Private Sector Opinions
Within the American private sector, opinions as to the efficacy and consequences of the
most recent protectionist legislation vary to a significant extent. On the one hand, groups in support
of what they perceive as an overdue protectionist measure cite substantial employment outsourcing
and diminishing relative competitiveness as grounds justifying such a measure.33 Members of this
contingent likely perceive exchange rate manipulation as a quasi-subsidy enjoyed by foreign
producers which affords them a comparative advantage in price competition. Additionally, given
that production is cheaper when priced in a depreciated currency, this side of the debate cites the
incentive for U.S. multinationals to shift production, and thus employment, to China in order to
take advantage of Yuan-denominated pricing. It is this element of their argument which could
potentially explain the dramatic decrease in manufacturing employment in the U.S., which dropped
from 18 million workers in 2000 to 12 million less than a decade later in 2009.34 On the other hand,
groups opposing the intervention defend their opinion by pointing to the possible disruption of
free-market efficiency, a relative cost increase of imported inputs of production, the possibility of
triggering a “trade war” with one of the U.S.’s biggest trading partners, and their conclusion that
the bill’s intended effects will fail to materialize in the economy.

32
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Among corporations opposed to intervention, the most significant of these motives is likely
that of exchange-rate-driven cost increases. A significant appreciation of the Yuan would translate
into higher inputs of production costs for U.S. businesses importing such inputs from China, and
these firms would then be faced with a decision to either pass on the costs to their consumers,
thereby diminishing their relative competitiveness as prescribed by the free market, or absorb the
costs internally, resulting in financial damages that may only be sustainable in the short-term. The
potential “trade war” this same contingent cautions against would have the same effect: out of
retaliation for forcing the Yuan upwards, China might impose tariffs on U.S. imports or tax U.S.
business operations in China more heavily, both of which would increase the cost of production for
any U.S. business involved.
While the opinions of nearly every American industry have been publicly voiced to
varying degrees, it remains largely ambiguous as to the industry or firm-specific factors which
most heavily influence opinions on the issue. Similarly unclear is the level on which opinions are
formed, a question that inherently depends on the factors identified as stimuli. Such ambiguity
gives rise to the question of whether all firms within an industry are unanimous in their opinion as
to how, if at all, to address the issue and whether there are firm-specific factors that take
precedence over broader, industry-level factors. In layman’s terms, is variance in opinion on this
issue most prominently observed at the macro, industry level, or the micro, firm level? Answering
this question would enable lawmakers and businesses alike to empirically speculate as to the
probable impact of currency reform legislation on the American economy. If, for instance, a high
degree of variance in opinion is found at the firm level, thus suggesting the probable effects of
passing H.R. 2378 on U.S. industries will be variable and potentially unpredictable, the Senate
would likely conclude that the potential consequences of passing the bill outweigh the benefits. If,
on the other hand, firms within major industries are found to be generally unanimous in their
positions for or against H.R. 2378, the Senate could make an empirically-grounded decision based
on whether the macro-economic benefits for the firms in favor of the legislation outweighed the
11

macro-economic consequences, including the possible “trade war” with China predicted by
industries opposing the bill. As it currently stands, published research quantifying cohesion of
opinion within industries on the issue of currency reform is narrow in scope and incomplete in
conclusion,35 while research addressing the matter explicitly with respect to H.R. 2378 is
nonexistent.
Given that research examining deviation in opinions on this issue at the industry level has
largely failed to materialize in scholarly literature, studies addressing the issue at the firm level are
even scanter. The research question best addressing this micro-level issue, however, can be stated
as follows: Have U.S.-based multinationals become so multinational that their label as “American”
is nothing more than just that? Placing the question in the context of currency manipulation, are
most globally-intertwined multinationals benefiting from currency manipulation by China, so much
so that they have become disinterested to its effect on their dollar-denominated operations? It is
important to note, however, that even in the same industry, no two multinationals have the same
invested stake in China, and thus there must be a demarcated threshold separating firms that would
rather see a continuously depreciated Yuan from those that have an interest in seeing the currency
strengthen relative to the dollar. It is this question of just how “American” are multinational entities
based in the U.S. that allows for an analysis of variance at the firm level within industries.
G. Addressing Foreign Exchange Grievances: The Role of the International Trade Administration
To preface the evaluation of the level on which opinions pertaining to currency reform are
formed, a discussion of what quantifies the private sector attitude towards trading partners’ foreign
exchange policies is necessary. Aside from directly influencing proposed legislation by means of
lobbying and “buying” relationships with representatives via campaign contributions, firms and
industries in the United States can voice their grievances on foreign exchange rate abuses by filing
“anti-dumping” petitions with the International Trade Administration (ITA), which operates under
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the Executive branch as an agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce. The agency, though
initially created to protect domestic industries from unfair foreign trade practices via the offset of
such abuses by means of subsidies and tax rebates, now must also “confront foreign governments
and their firms in the process of implementing U.S. trade laws.”36 The ITA has independent
decision-making power in terms of its discretion in declaring a particular grievance as founded or
unfounded but is still subject to oversight by the Department of Commerce, and thus the Treasury
and White House. The extent to which partisan oversight influences the agency’s rulings, however,
remains undetermined.
Though the ITA has no direct power to create legislation for approval by Congress, its
enforcement branch, the Import Administration, does have the authority to implement
countervailing subsidies and create information-gathering programs to protect specific U.S.
industries. One such program currently in effect is the Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis
System (SIMA), which gathers and publishes information about steel product imports to the United
States. According to its description, the system serves the U.S. steel industry using “two tools: the
steel licensing program and the steel import monitor.”37 The former allows U.S. businesses
importing steel products to obtain licenses to do so more quickly, while the latter monitors the
pricing and quality of steel imported to the U.S. relative to domestically-produced steel. In the
event that the tools at its disposal are insufficient to address perceived trade manipulation, the
agency may use its discretion and make recommendations to Congress as to the appropriate and
effective course of action, including formal legislation and direct negotiations with the country or
entity(s) involved.38 In the specific context of H.R.2378: The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act,
the ITA is given the authority to determine whether or not manipulation by a given country has
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occurred and subsequently impose a counteracting tariff or subsidy to protect the international
competitiveness of American businesses.39
While the ITA’s current scope of authority extends far beyond its original purpose, this
project will not consider any functions beyond the evaluation of dumping petitions filed by U.S.
industries. According to the ITA’s website, “dumping” occurs “when a foreign producer sells a
product in the United States at a price that is below that producer's sales price in the country of
origin (home market), or at a price that is lower than the cost of production.”40 When a U.S.
industry comes to the consensus that a foreign country is dumping to the detriment of the industry’s
competiveness in the domestic economy, “it may request the imposition of antidumping or
countervailing duties by filing a petition (with the International Trade Administration).”41 These
petitions are recorded, evaluated, and subsequently acted on based on the consensus of the
Department of Commerce and the ITA commission that “the imported products of foreign firms
sold at less than fair value, or the foreign firms are instead taking advantage of their government’s
subsidization policies. The ITA’s commission, the International Trade Commission, officially
charges a foreign firm or firms with dumping if the price charged in the U.S. is lower than the
foreign market value of the product, measured by the price foreign exporters charge in their
domestic markets on other trading partners’ markets.” 42 The secretive nature of the evaluation and
deliberation process makes it difficult to identify which of the two government entities exerts the
majority of influence in resolving issues pertaining to international trade. Charging a country with
dumping results in an order to the U.S. Customs Service to assess and impose a tariff on its imports
to the United States, thereby increasing the price of the imported product and helping U.S.

39

See THOMAS H.R.2378 Summary: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02378:@@@D
See “Dumping” in ITA FAQ Section,: http://trade.gov/faq.asp#dumping
41
See “How is dumping remedied?” in ITA FAQ Section: http://trade.gov/faq.asp#dumping
40

42

“Nation-State and Pluralistic Decision Making in Trade Policy: The Case of the International Trade Administration.”
P.183

14

industries compete more effectively with the sanctioned country.43 While the process is reasonably
accessible, the relief it provides typically takes over a year to fully materialize. According to a
statement on Import Administration’s information page, the process from the time of petitioning to
the imposition of countervailing measures is generally completed “within 12 to 18 months.”44 This
raises the question of whether such a tedious process deters some, if not a majority, of potential
petitioners. An additional deterrent is the likelihood of inaction on their petition. This is
particularly the case when, due to sensitive political relationships like the one which currently
exists between the U.S. and China, policymakers are hesitant to ruffle the proverbial feathers. Like
any form of accusation levied in the international community, “unfair” practice allegations
validated by the ITA have “important ramifications for political as well as economic relationships
between the U.S. and foreign countries.”45 If these two deterrents even moderately affect decisions
to file anti-dumping petitions, the extent of U.S. private sector resentment with respect to unfair
trade practices must be vastly understated.
While every industry in the United States is eligible to file and pursue anti-dumping
petitions, records indicate that both industries and individual firms are highly dissimilar in their
frequency and intensity of use. Existing research fails to identify or even speculate as to specific
characteristics which explain this high variance. Of the prior attempts to establish a relationship
between a quantifiable industry or firm-specific variable and the extent to which such an entity
makes use of anti-dumping provisions, some end abruptly at the broad conclusion that there is
variance based on unspecified “changes over time in industry exposure to international trade.”46
Other studies speculate that the explanation lies with factors such as import and export shares of an
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industry, product differentiation relative to foreign competitors, and capital-to-labor ratios.47 Aside
from the fact that all but the latter factor are very difficult to quantify in a way that would allow for
an empirical comparison, such explanatory variables would likely preclude any analysis from
venturing beyond the industry level to an examination of individual firms. In contrast, some other
projects identify the most prolific users of trade protection mechanisms, noting that “steel and
steel-related industries are by far the largest users of U.S. unfair trade laws,”48 yet these analyses all
stop short of making assertions as to what factors underlie this finding. It is interesting to note,
however, that while some industries utilize unfair trade mechanisms more heavily than others, the
ITA is seemingly “blind” to industry when making its rulings. Since 1995, for instance, the agency
has issued favorable rulings to domestic petitioner in 75% of dumping cases, independent of
industry or firm-specific characteristics.49

H. Exchange Rate Pass Through
One possible factor that might explain firm-level divergence is the degree of exchange rate
“pass-through” ability a particular firm has by virtue of their reputation, industry, or geographic
location. While firms within an industry generally have similar amounts of pass-through ability,
some have more than others depending on varying degrees of differentiation, reputation, and
market share. Exchange rate pass through might be the factor omitted by scholars who merely
come to the largely unexplained, albeit prevalent conclusion that “exchange rate changes can
trigger vastly different pressures on producers in different industries.”50 Exchange rate passthrough has not been thoroughly evaluated as a causal regressor affecting differences in exchange
rate pressure and sensitivity felt by firms or industries. Exchange rate pass-through is formally
defined as “the percent change in import (or export) prices for a percent change in the exchange
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rate.”51 Thus, firms most sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations are usually exported-oriented with
a high degree of foreign competition and low degree of differentiation, as their relative
competitiveness with foreign producers would be significantly diminished if they “passed-through”
exchange rate costs to their consumers. Consumers of goods traded by such firms would simply
purchase the product from a foreign producer whose price was unaffected by the exchange rate
fluctuation and was thereby comparatively cheaper. Recognizing the likelihood of this shift,
affected firms sometimes opt to keep prices constant in order to retain their consumer base and
preserve their established reputation, despite the long-term consequences posed by the shock if the
exchange rate fails to revert from its detrimental level.52 Given that this intuition obeys widely
recognized free-market intuition, pass-through likely affects the degree of an industry and its firms’
foreign exchange sensitivity, and grievances related to such sensitivity can be quantified via antidumping petitions.
Considering pass-through as a factor influencing the degree to which an industry is
sensitive and formally responds to exchange rate fluctuations is a time-worthy endeavor for a
number of reasons, but one stands out as particularly consequential. If pass-through is identified as
the primary factor, policymakers and economic leaders would have the ability to project the
probable effects of exchange rate fluxes, and preemptively counteract changes to keep domestic
industries globally competitive. Such steps might include the subsidy of production costs for
producers, purchase cost for consumers, or tax incentives for either party. Especially in a time of
outsourcing attributable to rising production costs in the U.S. coupled with falling production costs
in emerging markets, policymakers need to enhance their ability to protect American industries and
their domestic operations.
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I. Industry-Specific Exchange Rates
Reverting to the discussion of anti-dumping petitions and their functional purpose in the
private sector, another lens under which they could be considered is via their correlation to
industry-specific real exchange rates, which are determined and published by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York on a quarterly basis. The bank explains that the rates are weighted by a
consideration of numerous factors that other measures of exchange rates typically omit, including
pass-through, industry position in the economy, foreign and domestic competitive standing, and the
average share of revenue earned from exports versus imports for a given industry.53 Explaining
how these figures can be interpreted for use in an analysis, they describe that the exchange rates
“are defined as foreign currency per unit of U.S. dollar, so that an increase (decrease) is a dollar
appreciation (depreciation).”54 Interestingly, in a formal publication released by the New York Fed,
it is noted that the construction of such specific exchange rates is largely motivated by the
inconsistent impact of exchange rate fluctuations on different players in the private sector. Writing
on behalf of the Economic Policy Review and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Linda
Goldberg notes that “Although some industries are made worse off by real dollar depreciations,”
which can be considered equivalent to real Yuan appreciations for purposes of this project, “on
average the profits of U.S. producers rise.”55 It is subsequently observed that this inconsistency
owes itself to the varying proportions of industries’ revenue composed of exports versus imports,
as major currencies “generally have a stronger presence in U.S. exports than imports.”56 In light of
this discrepancy, additional measures which are weighted by export and import intensity, such as
industry-specific exchange rates, are useful when considering the effect of foreign exchange rate
fluctuations on certain industries in the United States. The variables incorporated in calculating
these rates include the share of industrialized economies in U.S. exports, denoted “M”, the share of
53
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To further narrow the parameters of this project to China, only those anti-dumping
petitions which specify China as the target country will be included. Based on the strength and
direction of the correlation, if it exists at all, several conclusions could be reasonably inferred. First,
holding U.S. REER constant, if a broad comparison of anti-dumping petitions against China in the
U.S., industry-specific exchange rates, and the Yuan REER indicates a statistically significant,
negative relationship between Yuan appreciation and the number of overall petitions, it would
indicate that U.S. industries’ perceptions of exchange rate abuses by foreign governments are, to
some extent, influenced by their given industry’s exchange rate as influenced by the real effective
exchange rate of China. Thus, the ITA and other trade-related bureaus of the government would
have a greater deal of direction in deciding which factors to more closely consider in the mitigation
of foreign exchange abuses alleged by U.S. industries. Such a finding might also facilitate more
dramatic changes in U.S. foreign exchange rate policy. Such changes could include legislation
explicitly specifying China as the target country, or the imposition of a permanent, across-theboard tariff on both inputs of production and final, finished goods imported from China.
To control for the effect of industry specific exchange rates with respect to changes in the
Chinese exchange rate, analyzed separately from the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the
Yuan and the Dollar is the bilateral exchange rate, quoted as annual average Yuan-per-Dollar. It is
worth preemptively noting that the regressions verifying the results yielded by the REERs via
replacing them with real bilateral exchange rates in identical regressions returned the same
correlations, and thus, analogous conclusions. Given that including these synonymous results
adjacent to those yielded by the REER data would be redundant and improperly elevate them
beyond an ancillary role, they are instead located in Appendix A.

K. Data Interpretation
While the results of our analysis may have broad implications for U.S. foreign policy, this
project aims to narrow the scope of interpretation even further. To identify whether opinions across
industries align on the issue, the aforementioned data will be primarily interpreted as follows:
20

If industry-specific exchange rates are insignificant in their effect on anti-dumping
petitions when considered simultaneously with the Dollar REER, which proves relatively
significant in its comparison, it can be inferred that across the broadest measures of industry
(manufacturing vs. nonmanufacturing), there is general consensus in opinion, which will be
assumed to hold true for the subcategories of these two segments.
If the significance of the U.S. Dollar REER disappears when industry-specific exchange
rates are considered simultaneously with the Yuan REER by their effect on anti-dumping petitions,
it can be reasonably assumed that across the broadest categories there are diverging opinions, but
there still may be an agreement across sub-industries (e.g. metal manufacturing, textile products).
If the significance of both the U.S. REER and industry specific exchange rates drop to
insignificant in their effect on petitions, there must be firm-level characteristics below those
specific to industries which account for divergence in opinion on the Yuan exchange rate.
While the private sector is the segment most pronouncedly affected by exchange rate
changes and makes the impact of changes clear via prices and petitions, its firms and industries
have a limited ability to address such changes independently. Equally important to an evaluation of
the level on which foreign exchange attitudes are shaped is a determination of how those attitudes
are addressed and represented in legislation. Any conclusions pertaining to factors or
characteristics determining the sensitivity of a firm or industry to exchange rate fluctuations, after
all, would be rendered irrelevant if policymakers were found to be uninfluenced or even
unresponsive altogether to petitions and foreign exchange shocks. One angle from which political
responsiveness to private sector grievances in this context can be measured is through a chronology
of anti-dumping petitions filed and legislation categorized as “import regulation”. This will allow
for a determination of the degree to which the mechanism serving to express the foreign exchange
complaints of U.S. industries and inspire legislation addressing such complaints is adequately
responsive and functional in practice. Existing work addressing the question of political
responsiveness to foreign exchange manipulation fails to specify if the inspiration for responses
21

was petitions filed by affected industries or the U.S. government’s independent recognition of the
manipulation and a subsequent decision to address it. As an illustration, Hanson and Park (1995)
conclusively identify the steel industry as that which petitions for and secures the most protection
from the U.S. government,60 but leave open to speculation the probable explanation as to why that
is. Recognizing the shortcoming of their research, the two scholars explicitly encourage future
research to broaden in scope so as to consider causal explanations, including “domestic political
factors”, “national interest factors,” and “international relations factors.”61
Regardless of whether a relationship exists between anti-dumping petitions and import
regulatory measures proposed simultaneously, an examination of whether the U.S. government
independently recognizes and addresses the effects of exchange rate fluctuations is a necessary
undertaking. While holding the number of anti-dumping petitions constant, evaluating the quantity
of trade regulatory measures with respect to industry-specific exchange rates and anti-dumping
petitions filed by individual industries against China will allow for a conclusion as to whether the
U.S. government proactively recognizes the value of the Yuan as having significant implications
for American industries and firms. The alternative and more likely case, though, is that the majority
of U.S. legislative responses are the product of Congress’ tendency to be reactive to private sector
currency concerns, formally voiced by industries and firms via anti-dumping petitions.
Given that all legislation proposed in Congress since 1949 is centrally recorded and
identified by multiple categories and subcategories of issue type, attempting to identify a positive
correlation between the number of proposed pieces of relevant legislation and anti-dumping
petitions filed at the same time is a viable task.
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CHAPTER TWO
CASE STUDY: H.R. 2378 (2009-10), “THE CURRENCY REFORM FOR FAIR
TRADE ACT”
In order to observe the perspectives mentioned above in a context which elicits a wide
variety of highly polarized opinions, the starting point for my analysis is a case study of a pertinent
U.S. legislative measure. As highlighted earlier, due to its potentially aggravating effect on
economic relations between the U.S. and China, and its likely detriment to American importers of
goods from China, the 2010 bill has drawn controversy and support from both sides of the
Congressional aisle and a wide array of groups in the private sector. Interestingly, however, as a
consequence of a trade dispute being with a major trading partner and world power, the
conventional route of mitigation through the ITA and Department of Commerce is entirely omitted
in news media reports on the bill. The likely explanation behind this is that firms and industries
recognize the futility of filing petitions against China, as the ITA would be very unlikely to take
conciliatory measures that risked igniting a trade war with the world’s second largest economy and
primary U.S. trading partner. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the bill
“would expand the definition of countervailing subsidies—financial benefits granted by
governments to certain domestic exporting firms—that could trigger the imposition of additional
import tariffs under current U.S. countervailing duty law. This bill would add to the list of such
subsidies the benefit enjoyed by a firm exporting from a country with a ‘fundamentally
undervalued” currency’. The bill specifies the mechanisms for determining the size of this subsidy
and for identifying a fundamentally undervalued currency.”62 Thus, the legislation would enhance
the ability of the U.S. government to proactively identify and address currency manipulation by
foreign monetary authorities. Prior to the introduction of H.R. 2378, as stated earlier, the primary
means by which U.S. authorities could begin an investigation of currency manipulation was in
62
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response to anti-dumping petitions filed by U.S. industries or interest groups, rather than their
being able to independently intervene based on its independently-derived perceptions.
Additionally, given the enhanced ability of U.S. authorities to impose countervailing tariffs and
subsidies in the event that they identify currency manipulation, the CBO projects the bill to raise
federal revenues by $125 million by the year 2020, with no peripheral effects on direct spending.63
Following its approval in the House of Representatives on September 29th, 2010, H.R.
2378 was subsequently sent to the Senate, where it presently remains in lieu of a more detailed
analysis by the Senate Committee on Finance. The CBO analysis continues a discussion of fiscal
implications for the government itself, but stops short of speculating on the potential costs incurred
by the U.S. private sector as a consequence of appreciated foreign currencies or retaliatory
monetary policies. According to some scholars, however, omitting this consideration makes for an
incomplete analysis, as doing so only accounts for a fraction of the groups affected by trade policy
decisions. While the effect on government finances is substantial, “three actors are involved in the
process: interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats. Interest groups seek to maximize their wealth
by lobbying politicians, politicians seek to maximize their political support from interest groups by
delivering interest group pressures to bureaucrats, and bureaucrats seek to maximize agency
budgets, subject to politicians’ rewards and sanctions.”64 Intuitively, then, an analysis of trade
policy requires a consideration of the aforementioned perspectives, which shift the focus to more
narrow interests, rather than merely projecting the policy’s effect on government spending power.
As is the case when most pieces of legislation are being debated by Congress, an even
more intense debate is taking place within the private sector. Unlike the debate within government,
however, which is constrained by traditional avenues and mechanisms by which legislators may
voice the opinions they perceive from their constituents, the private sector utilizes lobbying and
other forms of unconventional leverage to promote firm and industry interests. H.R. 2378 is by no
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means an exception to this tendency, but has rather become something of an anomaly on the upperbounds of lobbying intensity. According to the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), a
nonpartisan, non-profit, money-tracking government watchdog, over 80 individual firms and
associations have filed 221 reports in either support or opposition to the bill, with total spending
exceeding $100 million.65 While these figures seem excessively high at first glance, it is
noteworthy to point out that many of these groups lobbied as individual firms as well as via their
relevant interest groups with other firms in their industry, and such instances can be grouped
together by industry or lobby group association for purposes of a more concise analysis. Table 1
contains, in alphabetical order, the industries and interest groups that were reported to have lobbied
for or against H.R. 2378.
The documentation backing a particular group’s stance towards H.R. 2378 is readily
available online, sans an identification of the influencing factors. While these factors will be
eventually addressed, doing so must be prefaced with a breakdown of the explicitly stated
arguments behind the various groups’ positions on the bill. An analytical dissection of every
position for or against would be unfeasible and redundant, however, as groups sharing the same
broad opinion generally highlight similar, if not identical reasons for doing so.
Beginning with those groups supporting H.R. 2378 via their lobbying efforts, the Alliance
for American Manufacturing cites an ongoing threat to U.S. manufacturing jobs, the historical
success of currency reform measures, and the sheer size of its supporting contingent of firms as
grounds for the U.S. House of Representatives to pass the bill.66 More specifically, the group
estimates that from 2001 to 2008, currency manipulation by China alone has eliminated or
displaced 2.4 million American jobs, and speculates that additional U.S. job losses will range from
512,000 to 566,000 annually if the situation continues to go unchecked. The group proceeds to
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highlight the efficacy of aggressive, confrontational legislation in the past in order to predict that
similarly favorable results would be produced by H.R. 2378, noting that in the face of intense U.S.
Senatorial pressure in 2005, the Chinese authorities allowed the Yuan to appreciate by nearly 21%
before 2008. The final assertion made by the Alliance holds that successfully passing the
legislation would be in the interest of the majority of the private sector and its employees, as what
it describes as “hundreds of companies, associations, and other organizations” stand with it in
supporting the passage of H.R. 2378.67 As noted earlier, though, the letter does not reference
specific characteristics shared by firm or industry members which influenced their position in favor
of the legislation, and the letter limits the extent of its argument to merely outlining the detrimental
effect of currency manipulation on American workers and the U.S. economy as a whole, rather
than isolating specific sectors where injurious effects would be most pronounced.
Advocating for the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act along similar lines, the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers takes a comparable
macroeconomic perspective in conveying its members’ support for the legislation. The Association
identifies the growing U.S. trade deficit with China, the apparent futility of diplomatic conciliatory
measures, and the declining health of the U.S. economy as the primary factors underlying its
support for H.R. 2378.68 The group’s letter to the House of Representatives makes an unverified
claim that the Yuan is currently kept between 35 and 40 percent below its true value, and observes
that this undervaluation is the primary cause of the $600 billion U.S.-China trade deficit existing as
of 2009. The staggering trade deficit, it declares, is “like a cancer eating away at the heart of the
American economy.”69 The letter proceeds to cite Paul Krugman’s estimate that reducing the trade
deficit, to an amount it leaves unspecified, would increase U.S. GDP by 1.5%. It then highlights the
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results of a Peterson Institute study, which approximates that one million American jobs would be
created in the event that Chinese currency manipulation were to end.70 Once more, though, the
group’s discussion limits itself to factors affecting the health of the U.S. macro-economy and that
of American workers independent of sector, while remaining curiously silent as to the factors
which divide private sector opinions on the broader issue of currency manipulation and policies
developed in response.
The final argument chosen for an analysis of opinions in favor of H.R. 2378 is the
testimony of Leo Gerard, President of United Steelworkers, before the U.S. House of
Representatives Ways and Means Committee. Testifying on behalf of unions representing
employees of the steel, paper and forestry, rubber, miscellaneous manufacturing, energy, and
industrial service industries, Gerard emphasizes the need for economic recovery, the containment
of U.S. job losses, the importance of skilled labor for the survival of the American middle class,
and the increasingly-impaired ability of the U.S to operate self-sufficiently.71 Deviating slightly
from the domestically-oriented arguments of his colleagues in the contingency supporting H.R.
2378, Gerard testifies that the Chinese government, via its downward pressure on the Yuan, is
essentially affording Chinese exporters a 40% export subsidy for goods shipped to the United
States, and from the perspective of Chinese and other foreign consumers of U.S. goods, imposing a
tariff on U.S. imports abroad. The extent of his argument’s deviation from those of his fellow
supporters, however, ends abruptly following that point. The testimony which follows cites the
trade deficit and its negative effect on the U.S. economy, the outward flow of foreign direct
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investment from the U.S. to China, and the deteriorating health of the American middle class and
its workers.72
In light of the finding that arguments in favor of protectionist, countervailing measures like
those contained in H.R. 2378 entirely lack any micro-economic and firm level considerations, new
research which investigates the underlying factors which influence protectionism and the economic
level on which opinions towards currency manipulation and mitigation diverge appears to be
warranted to an even greater degree.
Transitioning to a discussion of entities lobbying against H.R. 2378, every group identified
as an opponent, via their signatures affirming association at the bottom of the document,
acknowledged that their opinion is wholly conveyed by means of a U.S. China Business Council
letter to Congress. The Council has membership spanning dozens of major industries, including
financial services, consumer electronics, footwear and apparel, miscellaneous retail, agriculture,
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In contrast to arguments in support of the bill, which
emphasize the effects of currency manipulation on the U.S. economy, this contention
acknowledges the need for China to appreciate its undervalued currency, but stresses that this
should be done by means of less confrontational methods. The primary alternative suggested by the
Council is to increase U.S. diplomatic negotiations with China and its monetary authorities, a
solution which has been vehemently rejected by supporters of H.R. 2378 as either too sluggish or
even entirely futile. In official language, the Council believes that the U.S. “should continue to
work multilaterally and bilaterally to press China to allow market forces to determine the value of
its currency, and thereby aid in the global economic rebalancing that it has called for along with the
other members of the G-20.”73 Aside from putting forth alternative suggestions, the petition makes
sure to outline its major criticisms of the proposed legislation. It appears to suggest that H.R. 2378
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does add in terms of new identification mechanisms and independent authority, but it is desperately
lacking in its specification of how much and under what circumstances, thereby subjecting policy
to the potentially disastrous consequences of discretionary interpretation.74 In concluding its
argument, the Council observes that China in particular has been historically known to be
unresponsive and even antagonized by foreign policy measures which seek to control the value of
its currency, and thus an additional measure might not have its originally intended effects, and may
actually do more harm than good should China retaliate and declare an outright “trade war” with
the U.S. Even if China didn’t take personal grievance with the measure, the Council warns that
enacting a highly aggressive trade policy might inadvertently shift the label of unfair trade
practitioner in the international community from China to the U.S., potentially decreasing foreign
demand for American goods as other countries took protectionist steps of their own. The effects of
such a shift, it adds, are economically counterproductive and work directly against the bill’s
intended outcome of economic growth and the preservation of American jobs.75
Unsurprisingly, just as the positions in favor of the legislation made no mention of industry
or firm-specific factors which influenced their formal stance beyond those shared by the macroeconomy as a whole, the stated opinions of groups against its passage were equivalently vague in
their discussion of inwardly-oriented considerations. It seems imperative, then, to initiate new
analyses seeking to identify the micro-economic or even firm-level factors shared by groups taking
similar positions on issues of currency manipulation. Such an undertaking, however, must be
preceded by a conclusive identification of the industry level on which private sector opinions most
frequently diverge.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR: IMPACT OF AND REACTIONS TO CHINA’S
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
In order to identify the industry level where divergence in private sector opinion is most
evident, the degree to which industries are analogously affected by fluctuations in the Yuan at the
broadest levels of “manufacturing” and “non-manufacturing” must first be determined. As outlined
earlier, this question is addressed via a series of regressions which reason that the real effective
exchange rate (REER) of the Yuan affects U.S. industry exchange rates, and thus an industry’s
sensitivity to changes in the value of the Yuan, via its direct impact on the U.S.-China trade
balance when the real effective exchange rate of the Dollar is held constant.
Beginning with the industries classified as “manufacturing,” I argue that the isolated effect
of the Yuan REER on industry specific exchange rates will be limited, albeit not to the extent that it
will be across the category of non-manufacturing. However, the effect of the Yuan on industry
exchange rates when considered indirectly via its effect on the U.S.-China trade balance will be
noticeably more robust. While the proportion of the effect cannot be feasibly isolated to account
solely for the amount attributable to the REER of the Yuan, the analysis proceeds under the
assumption that the intentions underlying China’s decision to peg its currency to that of its largest
trading partner are sufficient grounds to reason that the actual effect of the policy on widening the
vast trade gap between the two countries is substantial.
Table 2 summarizes the results of three separate regressions. From the results of the first
regression, it is evident that when considered as a standalone regressor, the real effective exchange
rate of the Yuan is only moderately significant in its effect on aggregate U.S. manufacturing
industries’ exchange rates. The coefficient of -.005 is significant only at the 5% level, despite a
sample of 744 observations across the three decades spanning 1980-2010.
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In the second analysis, however, which adds the trade balance between the U.S. and China
across the same time period, the robustness of the Yuan REER increases substantially. The
coefficients on both variables are significant at the 1% level, and the r-squared value increases
nearly seventy-fold from the first regression. It is widely recognized that, particularly between
countries that trade heavily with each other, the relative value of their currencies plays a dominant
role in the resulting trade balance between the two nations. In the context of American
consumerism, which relies almost exclusively on the depreciated Yuan for the continued
availability of low-cost manufactured products from China, this effect is likely to be atypically
pronounced when analyzing the cause of the U.S.-China trade deficit. Reverting to an analysis of
producers, however, the fact that both regressors are statistically significant at the same level is
reasonable grounds to assert that the Yuan REER, by virtue of its status as a factor affecting the
U.S.-China trade balance, carries significant weight in affecting U.S. industry-specific exchange
rates.
The third analysis enhances the statistical validity of the conclusion reached in the second.
Even while holding constant the real effective exchange rate of the U.S. Dollar, which has also
been recognized as a factor having a large effect on industry-specific exchange rates, the robustness
of the Yuan remains comparably significant at all levels at or above 1%. It is noteworthy to
mention that the U.S.-China trade balance was omitted in the third regression due to the inclusion
of its two primary determinants, and thus the additional presence of the trade balance would
redundantly account for the same variables.
Although the hypotheses are generally validated across an examination of the
“manufacturing” industries, the case might prove differently across their “non-manufacturing”
industry counterparts. Table 3 lists the results of three regressions similar to those discussed above,
with the only difference being that the dependent variable is the aggregated “non-manufacturing”
industries’ exchange rates.
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From the results of the first regression, it seems apparent that even for non-manufacturing
industries, the Yuan REER by itself has a limited impact on industry exchange rates. The resulting
coefficient, while significant at the 10% level, holds no further significance at either the 5 or 1%
level. While this conclusion is similar to those discussed earlier, the correlation is even weaker than
the 5% significance returned in the comparable regression conducted across manufacturing
industries. This may be the result of the components that most heavily contribute to the trade deficit
with China. While many U.S. non-manufacturing industries deal frequently with China and thus
have inevitable exposure to its currency, rather than the buying and selling of goods over which
China enjoys a comparative advantage, they deal instead in comparably intangible services. In
contrast to the substantial imbalance suffered by the U.S. as a result of more goods being imported
than exported, the imbalance with respect to the flow of services typically tilts in favor of the U.S.
In 2009, for example, the U.S. had a services surplus with China totaling $7.5 billion.76 While this
figure is miniscule compared to the $279 billion goods deficit existing in the same year, it is an
important observation for purposes of interpretation in this particular context. For example, the fact
that the correlation between the Yuan REER and non-manufacturing exchange rates is less robust
than the comparable correlation across manufacturing industries indicates that the driving force
behind non-manufacturing industry-specific must lie with some other regressor. Intuitively, this
suggests that non-manufacturing industries and firms are less sensitive, and thus less responsive, to
fluctuations in the value of the Yuan, assuming its value is considered independently.
In terms of statistical significance, the results of the second regression for nonmanufacturing are identical to those returned by the second regression for manufacturing. While
holding the REER of the U.S. Dollar constant, the effect of the Yuan REER becomes significantly
more pronounced, yet there is no statistical discrepancy between the significance of the two
currencies. Both are significant at the 1% level in their effect on non-manufacturing exchange
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rates, and, the coefficients again reveal the counteracting force of the two variables on each other.
When the REER of the Yuan increases, for example, the aggregate non-manufacturing exchange
rate can be expected to decrease, while an increase in the REER of the Dollar dictates an increase
in the same industry-wide rate. Given that the two currencies move essentially in lockstep with one
another by virtue of the peg maintained by the Chinese, the question arises as to whether this effect
would be at all noticeable in reality. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the effect of the Yuan
REER on the aggregate exchange rate for non-manufacturing industries, even while simultaneously
controlling for the effect of the U.S. Dollar REER, is statistically indiscernible from that which it
has on the exchange rate for manufacturing.
The third and final regression conducted in the context of non-manufacturing industries’
exchange rates and the causal impact of real effective exchange rates reveals a notable discrepancy
with the third regression on manufacturing discussed earlier. As highlighted above, in light of U.S.
non-manufacturing’s trade surplus with China, the statistical significance of the trade balance
between the two countries can be expected to be lower than that found across manufacturing, and
hence, other factors must account for a greater portion of what affects their industry-wide exchange
rates. According to Yang (1998), additional factors represented in industry-specific exchange rates
include an industry’s degree of product differentiation, its producer price index, the trade weighted
producer price indices of foreign competitors, the proportion of total industry supply composed of
imports, and the variability of marginal production cost.77 While an empirical analysis seeking to
determine the extent to which each of these factors impacts a given industry’s exchange rate
extends beyond the breadth of this study, it is important to recognize the broad range of factors
shaping industry exchange rates conjointly with pass-through elasticity. Despite this extensive list
of factors, however, the results of the regression clearly validate the predicted outcomes. The Yuan
REER is seen to be significant down to the 1% level, while the U.S.-China trade balance, found to
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be significant at the 1% level for manufacturing, is instead only significant at or above the 5%
level.
In analyzing the results of the regressions conducted for both “manufacturing” and “nonmanufacturing” as an aggregate, several conclusions can be reasonably inferred. First, provided
that the significance of the Yuan real effective exchange rate on industry-wide exchange rates for
both sectors was virtually nil when considered by itself but highly significant in conjunction with
the trade balance, the Yuan REER indirectly affects U.S. industry-specific exchange rates
overwhelmingly via its effect on the U.S.-China trade balance. This effect is shown to be
significant, and its significance remains constant even when the U.S. Dollar REER is
simultaneously held constant.
Second, the effect of the U.S.-China trade balance is most substantial across the groups
which most heavily contribute to its imbalance, which in this specific context are the American
manufacturing industries. These industries are helpless to mitigate the growing trade deficit which
owes its existence to a currency-driven Chinese comparative advantage in production. As a
consequence of producing and trading goods, rather than the less currency-sensitive services
brokered by the non-manufacturing industries, the aggregate manufacturing exchange rate is
noticeably more dependent than is the non-manufacturing rate on the trade balance, or lack thereof,
between the U.S. and China.
Lastly, given that the analyses reveal similar correlations in what causes changes in
industry-specific exchange rate changes at broad economic levels, the question remains as to what
factors influence a group’s opinion of and response to the Chinese real effective exchange rate.
To gauge industry responsiveness to China’s real effective exchange rate, I observed the
effect of industry pass-through elasticity, the Yuan REER, and industry-specific exchange rates on
anti-dumping petitions against China filed in the U.S. As outlined earlier, an industry or firm may
file an anti-dumping petition with the U.S. International Trade Administration against another
foreign industry or firm if it believes that the firm is exporting products to the domestic market at a
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price lower than that dictated by the forces of supply and demand. The forces accusers typically
cite as the means by which the accused party is able to do so include currency manipulation,
foreign export subsidies, and labor costs.78 The results of the analyses are contained in Tables 4 and
5.
Table 4 contains the results of the regressions analyzing responses by the manufacturing
industries. The most visible trend is the diminishing causal significance of pass-through elasticity
as additional regressors are added. While pass-through is significant at the 5% level in the first
regression and at the 10% level once the Yuan REER is added in the second, it becomes entirely
insignificant once industry-specific exchange rates and the Yuan REER are simultaneously
incorporated in the third. Given that our analysis has previously concluded that the Yuan REER is
closely linked to U.S. private sector attitudes, it is evident that the effect of pass-through elasticity
on U.S. manufacturing industry responses to Chinese currency manipulation is miniscule in
comparison. It is important to note, however, that pass-through elasticity is a factor in calculating
industry-specific exchange rates, so its 5% significance returned by the first regression may be
partially reflected by industry exchange rates in the third.
Overall, the data suggests that the Yuan REER is again a significant variable affecting
attitudes towards the Chinese Yuan, but fails to yield any robust conclusions as to the net effect of
pass-through elasticity. However, given that pass-through was found to have some significance as a
standalone variable, it must, to an unknown extent, affect industry-specific anti-dumping petitions.
The general lack of significance it carries indicates the possibility of omitted variables that might
more substantially affect manufacturing industries’ responsiveness to exchange rate manipulation
via anti-dumping petitions. Lastly, in light of the finding that the Yuan REER remained robust at
the 1% level even when pass-through elasticity and industry-specific exchange rates were
considered simultaneously, it might be the case that some industries are more sensitive to the rate
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than others. For example, some industries may think changes in the rate have even more negative
implications for the health of their industry than they actually do. Put simply, a “fear factor” may
exist with respect to the Yuan exchange rate from the perspective of some U.S. manufacturing
industries.
Table 5 contains the results of the regressions analyzing responses by the nonmanufacturing industries. From the results of the regressions, it is outwardly evident that the effect
of pass-through elasticity on non-manufacturing industries’ anti-dumping petitions is negligible.
Even when considered independently, pass-through has no statistical significance in its effect on
industry responses, and its significance departs even further from minute once additional variables
are considered. This suggests that unlike the results of the regressions conducted on manufacturing
industries’ data, pass-through does not have an indirect effect on anti-dumping petitions by virtue
of its inclusion in the derivation of industry-specific exchange rates. However, the fact that industry
exchange rates are significant at all levels implies that a factor other than pass-through elasticity
used in calculating these rates might substantially influence non-manufacturing responsiveness.
Other factors used in the derivation of industry-specific exchange rates include an
industry’s producer price index, its degree of product differentiation, the trade-weighted price
indices of foreign competitors, the percentage of total industry supply composed of imports, and
the variability of marginal production costs.79 Interestingly, the real effective exchange rate of the
Yuan and industry-specific exchange rates are significant at all statistical levels, reinforcing the
possibility that these two regressors are more substantial in their effect on U.S. private sector
attitudes towards the impact of the Yuan on competitive trade
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR: SENSITIVITY TO AND PREFERENCES FOR
THE YUAN’S VALUE
While the availability of research addressing which factors influence an American
industry’s opinion on the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate is limited, there are some analyses which have
explored the sensitivity and preferences of U.S. industries to the Dollar exchange rate by itself.
Such single-currency analyses are useful for purposes of this project to the extent that the Dollar
and the Yuan are, by virtue of the peg in place, inextricably linked. As such, a depreciation of one
is equivalent to an appreciation of the other, and this relationship holds regardless of the magnitude
of the fluctuation in either currency.
The conceptual framework outlined by Frieden (1991) is particularly useful in the way it
illustrates the distinct categories U.S. industries can be classified under in the context of exchange
rates. Table 6 contains a modified version of Frieden’s framework, interpreted to fit the context of
this analysis. The industries were positioned in the framework based on lobbying both for and
against H.R.2378, whose primary, albeit unsaid objective is to force the appreciation of the Yuan
relative to the Dollar. To determine a given industry’s preferred level of the exchange rate, simply
identifying whether an individual firm or industry lobbied for or against the inflammatory bill was
the process leading to the conclusion of whether the group favors a depreciated or appreciated
Yuan. Lobbying in favor of the bill’s passage was considered indicative of a preference for the
Yuan’s appreciation, while lobbying against the bill suggests the group has an interest in the
Yuan’s value relative to the Dollar remaining at its current depreciated level. To determine a given
industry’s sensitivity to a change in the value of the Yuan, and thus the degree of impact a given
change has on the health of the industry, industry-specific pass-through elasticities as determined
by Yang (1998) were considered below or above a midpoint threshold of .5. A pass-through
elasticity below .5 implies that the industry is highly-sensitive to changes in the value of the Yuan,
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suggesting that by virtue of its characteristics or reputation it has more difficulty passing on
exchange-rate-driven increases in the cost of production to its consumers. A pass-through elasticity
above .5 implies that the industry is less-sensitive, if at all, to changes in the value of the Yuan, as
it is able to pass exchange-rate-driven increases in production costs to its consumers without
jeopardizing its financial health.
As discussed above, on the horizontal axis industries are grouped following an analysis of
their preference level for the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate. Across this category, opinions are
polarized at the broader categories of “manufacturing” and “non-manufacturing,” suggesting that
their sub-industries are unanimous in their preferences. On the one hand, the manufacturing
contingent prefers an appreciated Yuan, and thus a relatively depreciated Dollar. On the other hand,
the non-manufacturing industries prefer a depreciated Yuan, and thus a relatively appreciated
Dollar. While these preferences are unsurprising, they are necessary for the subsequent grouping
based on sensitivity.
Along the vertical axis, industries are grouped based on the extent of the implications
posed by changes in the value of the Yuan relative to the Dollar. Contrary to industry position on
the level of the Yuan exchange rate, across this category there are industries from both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing that share the same grouping. For example, industries most
significantly affected by changes in the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate include “Telecom,” “Repair,”
“Textiles & Fabrics,” “Fabricated Metal Products,” “Food Manufacturing,” and “Primary Metal.”
Conversely, industries least affected by fluctuations in the Yuan are identified to be “Financial,”
“Business,” “Machinery,” and “Plastics/Rubber.” Thus, an industry’s sensitivity to exchange rate
changes cannot simply be predicted based on whether or not it produces tangible goods, rather than
services.
The categorizations along the vertical axis were made based on an industry’s pass-through
elasticity in conjunction with a qualitative analysis of its operations. To be classified as highly
affected by changes in the Yuan exchange rate, an industry must have a pass-through elasticity
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below .5. Any elasticity above .5 is grounds for the assumption that the effect of fluctuations in the
value of the Yuan on an industry is negligible. The classifications, however, while made based
solely on one statistical threshold but not as redundant in their implications as those along the
horizontal axis, make intuitive sense. Those industries least affected by exchange rate changes
cater primarily to the domestic market and use many inputs of production, which can be either
obtained domestically or imported from a wide variety of countries other than China. This is
particularly true in the context of the machinery and plastics industries, which likely have many
alternative countries from which they can obtain raw materials. Thus, changes in the Yuan
exchange rate might simply dictate a change in the source of industry’s supply of inputs, causing
miniscule effects on the industry’s health as a result of the Yuan changing in value.
In the context of the “business” industry, too, which is predominantly composed of retail
chains such as Wal-Mart, Target, McDonalds, and Home Depot, there are almost certainly
contingency plans to contend with changes in the currency of major supplier countries. Nondifferentiated clothing produced in Chinese factories, for example, can instead be obtained for a
similar price from nations such as Bangladesh, Thailand, and India, whose currencies remain
unchanged. Generic food labels, too, can likely be sourced to countries with more favorable
exchange rates with limited effort expended by the parent firm. As a result, companies brokering
such products to the U.S. domestic market experience little to no change in their margins in the
event that the value of the Yuan changes, and consequently feel a limited effect on the health of
their industry.
While the least affected firms appear to be those which have a diversified scope of
products and a large domestic consumer base, the fact that many of these companies have an
equally visible presence in foreign markets is also worthy of consideration. The rise of U.S.
multinational corporations (MNCs) has reshaped the realm of global commerce, particularly
because exchange rate exposure has become a substantial consideration in business decisionmaking. However, the sheer degree of the expansion of U.S. firms overseas which initially gave
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rise to exchange rate considerations has since made such considerations less significant. Some
firms are so diversified in their exposure to currencies and foreign markets that it becomes unclear
as to the net effect of an exchange rate change on the health of their business. For instance, a firm
that has production facilities in both the U.S. and China seeks to gain from an appreciation of the
Yuan, but simultaneously loses from a relative depreciation of the Dollar. Its investments in China
become more valuable in Dollar terms, but its competitive advantage in terms of U.S. consumer
demand for its Chinese-made products diminishes. As a result of the effect pulling in both
directions for some U.S. multinational conglomerates, the net effect of a change in the value of the
Yuan on the health of their firm might be close to zero. Consequently, such firms might be entirely
passive in their opinion and activism pertaining to exchange rate levels. Reverting to the case study
of H.R. 2378, one potential means to explore this possibility could involve identifying major U.S.based MNCs that were not represented at all in the lobbying campaigns either for or against the
passage of the bill. Although further elaboration on this possibility extends beyond the scope of this
analysis, it inevitably begs the question of just how “American” some of these U.S.-based firms
actually are.
Given that those industries found to be least affected by changes in the Yuan/Dollar
exchange rate, by virtue of their high degree of pass-through, are those either catering primarily to
a domestic consumer base or those which use non-differentiated inputs of production, those
industries most affected by changes in the value of the Yuan are all those which fail to meet these
criteria. In Figure 4, those industries with pass-through elasticities below .5 are classified as “high”
on the vertical axis, indicative of the large effect had by variations in the value of the Yuan relative
to the Dollar. Continuing with the industry groupings utilized in this study, these contingents
encompass the non-manufacturing sectors of “Telecom” and “Repair,” and the manufacturing
sectors of “Fabricated Metal Products,” “Food,” “Textiles & Fabrics,” and “Primary Metal
Products.” These industries have primarily international consumer bases, produce nondifferentiated goods for which there are alternative foreign suppliers, and, by virtue of their
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specialized nature, have less diversified exchange rate exposure. These industries’ status as
suppliers of raw materials to other industries, such as those classified as having low exchange rate
sensitivity, render their firms merely one of many options available to firms purchasing their
products. If the Yuan appreciates, for example, foreign and domestic demand for U.S.-produced
steel, textiles, food, and primary metal products would likely increase, as the comparable Chinese
products would be more expensive in comparison.80 Conversely, if the Yuan were to depreciate
beyond its current levels, demand for those same U.S.-produced items would diminish in favor of
the newly cheaper Chinese alternatives.81 Unless one of these industries were to establish
extensive production networks in China, changes in demand following exchange rate fluctuations
will continue to dictate their sensitivity to such changes.
Amongst the non-manufacturing industries identified as most sensitive to changes in the
value of the Yuan, a similar pattern is evident. Unlike the other two non-manufacturing sectors
selected for analysis, the “Telecom” and “Repair” industries based in the U.S. have a smaller
international consumer base, and provide services which are relatively non-differentiated compared
to other non-manufacturing industries. Their low levels of pass-through elasticities, therefore, are
unsurprising, and can be expected to continue having pass-through elasticities in the future.82
Unfortunately, unlike the possibility of diversification by broad, increasing exchange rate exposure
discussed as a potential explanation for passivity of highly-visible and far-reaching “financial” and
“business” U.S. multinational corporations, the number and scope of “telecommunications” and
“repair” MNCs is minute in comparison.
Based on the trends seen following the categorization of the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries by their preferred Yuan/Dollar exchange rate and the degree to which
each industry is affected by a change in its level, six conclusions are significant and supported by
data in the context of this discussion.
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First, the sub-industries within manufacturing and non-manufacturing are unanimous in
their opinions of what the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate should be. While this conclusion partially
conflicts with the hypothesis that pass-through elasticity is the primary driver of a group’s
preferred exchange rate, lobbying data and public statements by industry representatives provide
conclusive grounds on which to generalize their preferred Yuan/Dollar exchange rate. This is not to
say, however, that all sub-industries within these two categories are affected to the same extent by
changes in the level of the rate.
Second, the industries composing “non-manufacturing” strongly prefer a depreciated Yuan
relative to the Dollar. This is almost certainly a result of some element of the business models
behind industries in this group which are based on the provision of services, rather than goods.
Despite the variance of pass-through elasticity seen among the four sub-industries selected as
representative of non-manufacturing as a whole, scholarly studies and extensive lobbying patterns
reveal that the general consensus across this group is that the Yuan should remain at its current
depreciated level.
Third, the industries composing “manufacturing” strongly prefer an appreciated Yuan
relative to the Dollar. Again, this conclusion relies on the assumption that some component of these
industries’ business models, which are all based on the provision of goods rather than services,
serves as the explanatory factor behind the sector’s preferences. Similar to the anomaly identified
across non-manufacturing sub-industries, there is also a wide variance in pass-through elasticity
variance among the industry members of manufacturing. Regardless of these disparities, extensive
empirical data backs the conclusion that all sub-industries within manufacturing advocate for an
appreciated Yuan relative to the Dollar.
Fourth, in terms of the magnitude of the effects inflicted on a given industry, there are clear
characteristics explaining both high and low magnitudes seen across U.S.-based contingents, and,
unlike exchange rate preferences, the effects of changes in the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate are not
identical for all industries within each of the two broad categories. Rather, there are manufacturing
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and non-manufacturing industries which illustrate similarly-high sensitivities to changes in the
Yuan/Dollar exchange rate, while there are other groups within the two categories which
conversely reveal low-sensitivity. It is apparent that whether an industry is classified as either
manufacturing or non-manufacturing holds no weight in predicting the magnitude of the financial
impact a change in the Yuan/Dollar exchange rate has on the industry’s health.
Utilizing the tenets of the fourth conclusion, an industry can thus be expected to experience
a “low” magnitude of impact as a result of a change in the value of the Yuan if it either:


Has a primarily domestic consumer base, or



Produces a highly-differentiated offering of final goods or services composed of nondifferentiated inputs, or



Offers a highly-diversified range of production inputs to a large international
contingent of firms and consumers

These characteristics render an industry and some, if not all, of its firms as either entirely
insulated from Yuan fluctuations or geographically diversified enough across other currencies to
offset detrimental changes in the value of the Yuan.
Lastly, on the opposite end of the spectrum, an industry can be expected to experience a
“high” degree of impact following a change in the value of the Yuan if it:


Has a predominantly foreign consumer base concentrated in China and the immediate
surrounding region, or



Produces non-differentiated, highly-competitive inputs of production, or



Offers a non-diversified range of final products, or



Is a U.S.-based conglomerate with growth disproportionately concentrated in and
dependent on the Chinese economy

These characteristics render a firm or industry highly-sensitive to changes in the Yuan
exchange rate, and thus mean it has much to lose or gain based on which direction the rate moves.
It is important to note, however, that an industry’s sensitivity is not inherently permanent or
necessarily slow to change. This being understood, the classifications made in this analysis were
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made under current economic conditions and characteristics of the selected industries in the present
day, and might not be empirically valid on the mid to long-term horizon.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE U.S. PUBLIC SECTOR: MONITORING, IDENTIFYING & ADDRESSING
CHINESE EXCHANGE RATE MANIPULATION
While an analysis of private sector perceptions of the Chinese exchange rate is critical to
answering the research questions of on what level and to what extent industries diverge in their
opinions, equally important is an analysis of the issue from the perspective of the U.S. public
sector. After all, anti-dumping petitions and industry exchange rates would be useless mechanisms
if what they inferred was not subsequently acknowledged and addressed by some authority. The
extent and procedure by which protectionist measures are formally instated by the United States
Congress remains a topic that lacks substantive empirical research. Unanswered questions in this
realm include, but are not limited to, whether the U.S. government independently and proactively
addresses exchange rate manipulation, the degree, if any, of legislative responsiveness to private
sector foreign currency grievances, and whether that responsiveness varies depending on the
industry(s) declaring such infringements.
Although there is no formal statistic which conveys the responsiveness of Congress in
addressing issues of foreign currency manipulation, all legislation since 1940, both proposed and
passed, is catalogued and identified based on the issue(s) addressed.83 By identifying all legislation
addressing issues of international trade abuses by China and subsequently comparing all such
instances to grievances voiced against China by the U.S. private sector at the same time, a general
measure of legislative responsiveness may be established. If the correlation is strong, a reasonable
conclusion would be that Congress is primarily reactive in addressing foreign currency
manipulation, only doing so after such instances are brought to its attention by the private sector. If,
however, the correlation is only moderately strong or even inconsequential, an alternative inference
would be that the government is primarily proactive in implementing protectionist measures, and
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the mechanisms afforded to the private sector for bringing the issue to lawmakers’ attention are
largely futile in their efficacy.
For the purposes of this analysis, the following categories of legislation were identified as
relevant:


1802: “Trade Negotiations, Disputes, and Agreements”



1804: “Import regulation”



1806: “Productivity and Competitiveness of U.S. Businesses



1807: “Tariff and Import Restriction”



1808: “Exchange Rates and Related Issues”

To consolidate the data for manipulation, pieces of legislation in every year since 1980
classified as one of the above types and having China as its target country were aggregated and
paired with anti-dumping petitions against China filed across the same time period. However,
doing so only analyzes the public sector’s response to currency manipulation from a reactive angle.
In order to determine whether Congress is partially or entirely proactive in addressing the issue,
two additional variables must be included. The additional variables which account for this
possibility were each year’s U.S-China trade balance and the real effective exchange rate (REER)
of the Yuan for the same year. Given that the Yuan REER has a substantial influence on the U.S.China trade balance, and thus including both figures simultaneously would result in a doublevariable bias, the two statistics are independently analyzed in two separate regressions.
Table 7 contains the results of four separate regressions conducted to examine whether
legislative responsiveness to Chinese exchange rate manipulation is either proactive, reactive, or a
combination of the two.
From the results of the first regression, it is clear that anti-dumping petitions are positively
correlated with the introduction of new protectionist measures in Congress. Anti-dumping petitions
are significant in their effect at the 1% level, indicating a strong statistical relationship. From this
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regression by itself, however, it is unclear whether other factors weighing on Congress are the true
causality for increased amounts of legislation.
The second regression, which incorporates the effect of the U.S.-China annual trade
balance as an additional regressor, has several possible implications. The most obvious of these
implications is that both anti-dumping petitions and the trade balance across the same time period
have similarly large, significant effects on the amount of protectionist legislation introduced in
Congress, and exert their influences independently of one another. The second and more likely
possible implication is that the two variables exert their effect on the number of protectionist
measures in a conjoined yet unclear manner. For instance, it is likely that anti-dumping petitions
are higher when the trade balance is more lopsided, as there are more groups adversely affected by
the deficit with incentives to petition for legislative protection. Taking this perspective, it is
difficult to determine which of the two factors, if not certain elements of both, Congress is taking
into account in making the decision to introduce additional legislation. Both regressors are
statistically identical in their significance as causal variables, so the subsequent analysis must
clarify the true causal regressor by isolating the factors which most substantially affect the trade
balance itself.
In the context of the U.S.-China trade balance, the most important determinant of how big
America’s deficit with China is in any given year is the real effective exchange rate of the Yuan,
which almost completely dictates U.S. consumer demand for Chinese exports. The third regression
accounts for this variable independently of the trade balance in order to determine whether the
positive correlation between protectionist legislation and the trade balance is merely an indirect
consequence of the government responding to an increased volume of petitions during times of
large trade deficits. The results of the regression confirm this possibility, as the significance of the
Yuan when included simultaneously with anti-dumping petitions is inconsequential at all levels.
The significance of anti-dumping petitions remains robust at all levels at or above 1%, giving rise
to the preliminary conclusion that the government is more reactive in its implementation of
47

protectionist legislation, rather than taking a proactive approach based on its internal perceptions of
foreign currency and trade policies.
The results yielded by the fourth regression provide further support for the conclusion that
in introducing new protectionist measures, Congress is doing so reactively rather than proactively.
The significance of the trade balance at the 1% level, as discussed earlier, can be explained by the
cause-effect relationship between a trade deficit with a foreign trading partner and an increased
volume of anti-dumping petitions against that partner. The third regression illustrates that Congress
is primarily responding to the effect in this relationship, that being the increase in anti-dumping
petitions filed in response to the cause, identified as the lopsided trade balance. To further reinforce
this conclusion, the real effective exchange rate of the U.S. Dollar was added as a variable in the
fourth regression, as changes in this regressor would not only affect the trade balance with China,
but would also spur changes in the number of anti-dumping petitions filed by U.S. firms and
industries whose financial health is significantly reliant on this trade-weighted value of domestic
currency. This regressor also proved to be significant down to the 1% level, but this can be
explained via its propensity to affect anti-dumping petitions in a manner similar to that of the trade
balance.
Although it may seem reasonable to entirely write off the possibility that the government is
independently proactive in addressing foreign currency and trade manipulation, some of the claims
outlined above rely, at least in-part, on assumptions made as to cause-effect relationships between
various elements in the macro-economy. As a result, a more detailed analysis might reach the same
conclusions with more empirical backing, but the question itself is not of utmost importance for
this particular project, so the analysis discussed above, though partially speculative, is sufficient to
meet our eventual research objectives.
Bearing in mind the implications of the regression contained in Table 6, primarily the
suggestion holding that Congress is predominantly reactive in addressing foreign currency
manipulation, the question arises as to whether lawmakers are more reactive to grievances filed by
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some industries than they are to those filed by others. For example, are anti-dumping petitions filed
by the steel industry more positively correlated with new protectionist legislation for the steel
industry than are petitions filed in the same time period by the financial industry? An inherent
consequence of exploring this question is a resurfacing of the question asking whether Congress is
reactive or proactive, but the results will have instead implications at micro, rather than macro
levels of the economy. An additional question follows that if there is variance in Congress’
response based on the identity of the petitioner, what factors specific to the industry can explain
such discrepancies? While the natural inclination is to assume that Congress is universally “blind”
to the identity of those petitioning for trade protectionism, historical evidence and sharply varying
degrees of private sector lobbying influence make this assumption unlikely to be validated.
To address these questions, industries at the extremities of pass-through elasticity were
isolated within “manufacturing” and “non-manufacturing.” The stark differences in pass-through
ensure that the industries are as different from each other as possible in terms of their specific
exchange rate sensitivity and preferences, thus providing discernible grounds for Congress to be
more receptive to petitions filed by one industry over the other. In the first set of regressions, the
receptiveness of Congress to the exchange rate for “primary metal,” the manufacturing industry
with the lowest pass-through elasticity and consequently the highest exchange rate sensitivity, is
compared to lawmakers’ responsiveness to the “financial” industry’s petitions, which has the
highest degree of pass-through amongst the non-manufacturing industries. In the second set of
regressions, the non-manufacturing industry with the lowest pass through, “repair services,” is
paired with the manufacturing industry with the highest pass-through, “machinery,” and the results
are interpreted along identical lines as discussed above. In the second regression for each industry,
anti-dumping petitions are included as a factor in order to further illustrate Congress’ status as
reactionary in its implementation of protectionist measures. This assertion will be furthered if the
statistical significance of industry exchange rates increases across-the-board following the
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incorporation of industry anti-dumping petitions. Table 7 contains the results of the first set of
regressions, while Table 8 contains those yielded by the second.
As is shown in Table 8, the effect of the financial industry’s exchange rate on legislation
identifying the industry as either driving or protected by its implementation is significant at the
10% level by itself. However, this effect increases to significance at the 1% level once antidumping petitions are included in the second regression. This is unsurprising, though, as it merely
reiterates Congress’ reactive nature in implementing protectionist legislation. Further evidence of
this is the change in R², which increases by nearly six fold between the first two regressions, again
illustrating the strength of anti-dumping petitions in producing protectionist legislative measures.
While the possibility that Congress independently recognizes and mitigates foreign currency threats
to the financial industry cannot be completely disregarded, the reactive nature of lawmakers is
evident in the context of the financial industry.
From the data yielded by the regressions for the financial industry alone, the assumption
that Congress is “blind” to the identity of the petitioner is supported. Shifting to the industry with
lower pass-through relative to the financial industry, however, the results of two regressions
suggest otherwise. The exchange rate for primary metal manufacturing, considered independently,
is more significant in its effect on protectionist legislation than is that of the financial industry, as it
is shown to be statistically robust down to the 5% level. While this seems statistically trivial, the R²
for its relationship with protectionist legislation represents an 84% increase from the comparable
regression conducted for the financial industry. Thus, a preliminary conclusion is that Congress is
more likely to independently recognize and address, thereby taking a proactive approach,
detriments facing the primary metal manufacturing industry than they are for those facing the
financial industry. The results of the fourth regression, which incorporates primary metal antidumping petitions, are nearly identical to those returned by the equivalent regression conducted for
the financial industry. The effects of both the industry exchange rate and industry anti-dumping
petitions on protectionist legislation are significant down to the 1% level, and the comparable value
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of R² is indicative of a similar level of Congressional reactiveness to petitions by the two
industries. The most substantial conclusion, however, is revealed by the final regression. Once antidumping petitions by both industries were omitted, and the only included factors were the two
industries’ exchange rates, the significance of the financial industry’s rate drops to inconsequential,
while the primary metal rate is shown to still have an effect at the 10% level. While this is not the
strongest of relationships, it is important to recognize that the regression isolates the nature of
Congress as a proactive force, because industry exchange rates alone do not directly pressure
lawmakers into taking action like anti-dumping petitions do. Given that Congress has been seen as
a predominantly reactive force, the partial significance of a variable gauging a proactive response
suggests that Congress might preemptively protect certain industries.
From the data contained in Table 9, there is some divergence from the patterns which
emerged in the regression summarized in Table 8. Even when considered independently, “repair
services,” the non-manufacturing industry with the lowest pass-through, was shown to be
statistically significant at or above the 1% level. This gives further rise to the possibility that
Congress proactively protects industries with lower pass-through elasticity, regardless of their
manufacturing or non-manufacturing status. This is likely a result of the cost control measures
taken by industries hit hardest by exchange rate fluctuations in the interests of financial solvency.
One effective and highly controversial means by which U.S. companies have done so in recent
years is via layoffs of their American employees;84 an issue that has sparked constituent outrage
and intense partisan debate in the halls of Congress and beyond. Given that lawmakers have a
vested interest in preserving U.S. jobs and increasing productivity, it is a reasonable assumption
that they would primarily attempt to do so for industries most vulnerable to exchange rate-driven
cost increases. Reverting to the analysis of our data, once anti-dumping petitions filed by the repair
services industry are included, the significance of the industry’s exchange rate remains robust at the
1% level, and the petitions themselves are shown to be equally significant. Interestingly, the R²
84
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increases three fold from the first regression, suggesting that even for industries with low degrees
of pass-through, Congress is still highly reactive in its implementation of protectionist measures.
In the context of the machinery industry, which represents the manufacturing industry with
the highest degree of pass-through, the results reinforce the conclusion that Congress is more
proactive on behalf of industries with low pass-through. As the conclusion would predict, the
significance of the machinery industry’s exchange rate is only significant at the 5% level when
considered independently, compared to the 1% significance held by the lower pass-through
industry of repair services in the first regression. In turn, the significance of the exchange rate
increased in robustness to 1% significance once the variable assessing the reactive component,
anti-dumping petitions, was included. In the final regression, however, the expectations dictated by
our preliminary conclusion were defied. Once the exchange rates of the two industries were
considered simultaneously and anti-dumping petitions were omitted, both variables became
significant at the 1% level. Unlike the results of the comparable regression summarized in Table 8,
the high pass-through industry was not only statistically robust, but actually increased in
significance to the highest degree of robustness from the regression which considered it
independently. While this partially detracts from our “low pass-through, proactive response”
conclusion, two possibilities are worth mentioning. Congress may be generally more proactive for
all manufacturing industries, due to their comparably low pass through and historical stigma as the
true “American” tenets of the U.S. economy. If this is the case, the data can still provide for the
conclusion that in the context of non-manufacturing industries, which have a higher degree of passthrough variance, Congress is partially proactive for those industries with lower pass through, and
almost entirely reactive for those industries with higher pass through. An additional possibility
behind the anomaly in the fifth regression is that the machinery industry, by virtue of its
interconnectedness to similar manufacturing industries with lower pass-through, is so closely
intertwined with such industries that it is frequently grouped together as a primary driver of
legislation. Unlike non-manufacturing industries, which are more distinct in the purpose and scope
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of their functions, manufacturing industries might be difficult to discern from one another, as the
line dividing them can be blurred by their status as producing either inputs or final units of
production, or both. Despite this anomaly, as significant in its implications as it is, the conclusions
that lawmakers are more likely to implement protectionist measures proactively for industries with
lower pass through and are even more likely to do so reactively for the same industries are both
still supported by the data.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
From the results of my analysis, three conclusions and their subsequent implications are
robustly supported.
First, reverting to the original question asking where divergence in opinion on issues of
exchange rates predominantly occurs, it is evident that the bifurcation of U.S. private sector
opinion occurs at the broadest levels of “manufacturing” and “non-manufacturing.” Intuitively, this
divide is thus between the sector which produces tangible goods and that which provides services
or sells tangible goods. When taken in the specific context of the Yuan, the two sides advocate for
the currency to be either appreciated or depreciated relative to the Dollar, respectively. Below this
level, however, firms and industries are overwhelmingly unanimous in their stance. Consequently,
in political decision-making on protectionist legislation, lawmakers should be conscious of the
impact their vote has on their reputation amongst these two massive economic groups.
Second, following the identification of where divergence in opinion primarily occurs, an
analysis of economic variables which might account for such divergence revealed that, contrary to
my original hypotheses citing exchange rate pass-through and industry-specific exchange rates, the
real effective exchange rate (REER) of the Yuan has the most robust correlation with industry level
opinions. This remains true of the variable even when considered simultaneously with the Dollar
REER and the U.S.-China trade balance. While it is still the case that an industry with high passthrough is less affected by changes in exchange rates than is an industry with low pass-through, no
divergence in opinion was found between industries within the two broad sectors, despite having
vastly different pass-through elasticities. The most important implication of this finding follows:
that the factor underlying the polarization at the broadest levels must be related to the groups’
status as either providing goods or services, and in this particular case, secondary factors pertaining
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to China and its economic relationship with the United States almost certainly have some degree of
influence.
Third, I have shown that legislative responsiveness to industry grievances concerning the
Yuan suggests that Congress is predominantly reactive, rather than proactive, in implementing
protectionist measures which defend and promote the competitiveness of U.S. firms and industries.
Further, its degree of responsiveness is uniform for all industries, regardless of their standing or
importance in the U.S. economy. Interestingly, however, when Congress is instead proactive and
independent in implementing protectionist legislation, it does not do so in the same objective
manner. Our results indicate that legislators independently identify foreign trade disadvantages
burdening manufacturing industries more often than they do for non-manufacturing industries.
While this is not to suggest legislative favoritism or biases, it does first raise the question of
whether lawmakers are conscious of this tendency, and, if so, is it a consequence of their
perception that manufacturing industries are more valuable to the economy or are instead simply in
greater need of protection.
Although my analysis returned several substantive conclusions with significant
implications for U.S. trade policy, it is not without limitations. Chief among these emerges due to
the regressors, which, by virtue of being indicators of similar things, are so closely related and in
some cases even partially overlapping. Industry-specific exchange rates, for instance, incorporate
the real effective exchange rates of the Dollar and major trading partner currencies. This makes it
difficult to isolate the effect of one over the other, and while this was partially controlled for via
holding one constant, the precise extent of the effect of the Yuan REER on American private sector
opinions is likely not contained in my data.
An additional, more discernible limitation is the narrowness of the time period analyzed,
which spanned a mere three decades from 1980-2010. However, given that the bulk of
modernization in China has occurred in the past twenty years, extending the time frame further into
the past would undoubtedly skew the results of the data with economic statistics comparable to a
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third-world economy, rather than a global superpower. However, this short chronological window
also prevents an analysis of the U.S. before 1980, which might have returned dramatically different
results than those outlined earlier.
The final limitation to my analysis is also one stemming from a limited of a field of view.
The case study, substantive as it is, only allows for the analysis of a single instance involving the
issue at hand. However, given the highly-visible nature of the debate and lobbying efforts, coupled
with a wealth of publicly-accessible data, the case still provides a clear vantage point from which to
identify the industry players on both sides of the issue.
Future work should not only address the weaknesses outlined above, but could also
reinforce the possibility that some of my conclusions are indeed specific to China and its
manipulated economy and exchange rate. This could be done more than one way, though the most
direct route would utilize similar empirical tests, but do so for some other major U.S. trading
partner. Potential subject countries include Canada, Japan, and Germany. These all represent
countries with exchange rate systems similar to the United States, and have a U.S. trading volume
similar to that of China. Should the results appear similar to those returned in this project, the
conclusion that the unique sensitivity of U.S. industries to the Yuan is due to its status as “pegged”
at an excessively depreciated level would be substantially undermined. If, however, discernible
differences were found between those nations and China following an analysis via the same series
of regressions, the same conclusion would be further validated.
Additionally, future work should analyze political decision-making at the level of
individual Congressmen. Our research suggests that Congress is universally responsive and at least
partially proactive in mitigating exchange rate concerns, but does not quantify the role of special
interests at play on behalf of the petitioners. For instance, it may be the case that the sheer volume
of lobbying and campaign contributions by the steel or primary metal industry drove the eventual
creation of H.R.2378. Conversely, the lobbying efforts of the bill’s opponents might explain its
ongoing status as tabled and stagnant in the Senate. While lobbying efforts are typically similar in
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their intensity on both sides of an issue, an exploration into such possibilities is an important
undertaking for the future.
Despite these limitations, I have illustrated perhaps the most invaluable reality of the 21st
century: the U.S. private sector, and with it the global economy, is at the mercy of Chinese
exchange rate policy. Movements in the value of the Yuan, due to the underlying factors which
indirectly affect it, reverberate throughout firms ranging from corner stores to multinational
conglomerates, yet there is no clear consensus amongst those affected as to its appropriate value. In
light of this disagreement, even remedial policies implemented by the U.S. government will
inevitably result in damages to a substantial bloc of the economy, and even so, run the risk of
triggering a U.S.-China “trade war” that could all but eliminate the export market for certain
industries and push the domestic cost of living to unprecedented levels. Consequently, Chinese
monetary policymakers have virtually boundless control over the health of foreign firms and
industries. A normative discussion as to whether the situation should be addressed via forced or
diplomatic measures would deviate beyond the bounds of this analysis, but given the implications
discussed throughout, the one certainty is that government and the private sector alike cannot
afford the continuance of indecision.
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TABLES & FIGURES
Table 1: Lobbying Data on H.R. 2378
Groups Supporting H.R. 2378







Groups Opposing H.R. 2378


AFL-CIO
Alliance for American Manufacturing
Aluminum Extruders Council
American Iron & Steel Institute
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers
United Steelworkers

















American Apparel & Footwear
Association
American Meat Institute
American Soybean Association
Coalition of Service Industries
Financial Services Roundtable
International Dairy Foods Association
National Cattleman’s Beef Association
National Council of Farmer
Cooperatives
National Fisheries Institute
National Retail Federation
Pacific Coast Council of Customs
Brokers & Freight Forwarders
Securities Industry & Financial Markets
Association
Sporting Goods Manufacturers
Association
TechAmerica
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
USA Poultry & Egg Export Council

The data on groups in support or opposition to H.R. 2378: The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, was
retrieved from J. Lawrence Broz (2010), who organized the data based on lobbying research completed by a
research team at Maplight.org, a nonprofit research organization which tracks money in politics. Maplight
lobbying research was conducted via the compilation of separate data from OpenSecrets, FollowTheMoney
and GovTrack.
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Table 2
DV: Mfg. Industry
Exchange Rate
Yuan REER

1

2
-.05 (.055)**
-.9189

USD REER

3
-.0844 (.0033)***
-25.58
.8141 (.0079)***
45.56

-------------

.11165 (.0157)***
7.11
-------------

U.S.-China Trade
Balance
Constant

-------------

-------------

-1.308e^-5 (4.05e^6)***
-3.266

17.53 (.849)***
-.919

34.5854 (1.659)***
20.84

92.9156 (1.982)***
46.87

744

744

744

.001144

.73852

.07827

Number of
Observations
R²

Figures in parenthesis represent robust standard errors; italicized figures represent t-statistics; significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% levels is denoted “*,” “**,” and “***,” respectively

Table 3
DV: Non-Mfg.
Industry Exchange
Rate
Yuan REER
USD REER

1

2
.00486 (0068)*
.7106

3
-.0861 (.0042)***
-20.74
.9296 (.0225)***
41.35

-------------

U.S.-China Trade
Balance
Constant

.1685 (.0179)***
9.405
-------------

-------------

-------------

-1.053e^-5 (4.574e^6)**
-2.303

103.594 (1.0596)***
97.76

20.384 (2.085)***
9.776

83.8959 (2.2572)***
37.17

620

620

620

.0008

.7351

.1463

Number of
Observations
R²

Figures in parenthesis represent robust standard errors; italicized figures represent t-statistics; significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% levels is denoted “*,” “**,” and “***,” respectively
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Table 4
DV: Mfg. antidumping petitions
Pass-Through
Elasticity

1

2

3

.00392 (1.0458)**
.003744

-.00398 (.9579)*
-.00416

.1821 (.95023)
.1916

Yuan REER

-------------

-.02243 (.00188)***
-11.93

-.02218 (.00186)***
-11.91

Industry Exchange
Rate

-------------

-------------

.04846 (.01255)***
3.86

Constant

5.3506 (.3473)***
15.41

8.5284 (.4146)***
20.56

3.2604 (1.4253)**
2.288

Number of
Observations

739

739

739

R²

-.00136

.16213

.17877

Figures in parenthesis represent robust standard errors; italicized figures represent t-statistics; significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% levels is denoted “*,” “**,” and “***,” respectively

Table 5
DV: Non-mfg. antidumping petitions
Pass-Through
Elasticity

1

2

3

1.0615e^-12 (2.8656)
1.276e^-13

1.0652e^-12 (7.4825)
1.424e^-13

-1.15263 (7.44695)
-.1548

Yuan REER

-------------

-.02476 (.000204)***
-12.12

-.02494 (.00203)***
-12.28

Industry Exchange
Rate

-------------

-------------

.03516 (.011965)***

Constant

5.3548 (2.8656)*
1.869

8.8531 (2.5934)***
3.414

5.6069 (2.8042)**
1.999

620

620

620

-.0016

.19239

.20355

Number of
Observations
R²

Figures in parenthesis represent robust standard errors; italicized figures represent t-statistics; significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% levels is denoted “*,” “**,” and “***,” respectively
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Magnitude of Effect
Caused by a Change
in the Yuan/USD Rate

Table 6
Low

High

Table 7
DV: Industry-Specific
Protectionist legislation

Preferred Yuan/Dollar Exchange Rate Level
Depreciated (Non-Manufacturing)
Financial (.682)
Business (.589)
Telecommunications (.4137)
Repair (.333)

Appreciated (Manufacturing)
Machinery (.7559)
Plastics & Rubber (.5318)
Fabricated Metal Products
(.3138)
Food Manufacturing (.2485)
Textiles & Fabrics (.3124)
Primary Metal (.2123)

1

2

3

4

Anti-Dumping Petitions

.1748
(.0182)***
9.5828

.0657 (.0188)***
3.5001

.1685 (.0199)***
8.4516

.0697 (.0174)***
3.9969

Trade balance

--------

-9.04e^-6 (7.31e^-7)***
-12.374

--------

-6.5e^-6 (7.2e^-7)***
-9.028

Yuan REER

--------

--------

-.0009 (.0011)
-.7893

--------

Dollar REER

--------

--------

--------

-.0548 (.005)***
-11.0304

2.213 (.1072)***
20.6526

2.485 (.2319)***
10.7114

8.06 (.5392)***
14.9463

739
.2639

739
.2915

739
.3685

Constant
Number of Observations
R²

2.327
(.1173)***
19.8416
739
.1108

Figures in parenthesis represent robust standard errors; italicized figures represent t-statistics; significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% levels is denoted “*,” “**,” and “***,” respectively
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Table 8
DV: IndustrySpecific
Protectionist
Legislation

1

2

3

4

Exchange Rate:
Financial

-.039 (.0227)*
-1.7648

-.051 (.0194)***
-2.6284

______

______

Exchange Rate:
Primary Metal

______

______

-.044 (.018)**
-2.4775

-.047 (.0153)***
-3.0623

Anti-Dumping
Petitions

______

.306 (.0494)***
6.1954

______

.2861 (.0479)***
5.9759

______

Constant

7.417 (2.354)***
3.1514

6.731 (2.005)***
3.3561

6.714 (1.68)***
4.0011

8.243
(2.349)***

Observations
R²

100
.0308

100
.3056

100
.3032

100
.057

8.052
(1.92)***
4.1822
100
.0567

5

-.0042
(.0295)
-.1436
-.042
(.0239)*
-1.7391

Figures in parenthesis represent robust standard errors; italicized figures represent t-statistics; significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% levels is denoted “*,” “**,” and “***,” respectively

Table 9
DV: IndustrySpecific
Protectionist
Legislation

1

2

3

4

5

Exchange Rate:
Repair Services

-.0756
(.0222)***
-3.411

-.0803 (.019)***
-4.2927

______

______

-.0247 (.0592)***
-3.9978

Exchange Rate:
Machinery

______

______

-.0432 (.021)**
-2.092

-.056 (.0176)***
-3.1861

.1556 (.0533)***
2.917

Anti-Dumping
Petitions

______

.302 (.0464)***
6.5053

______

.312 (.0484)***
6.4412

______

Constant

11.12 (2.321)***
4.7908

9.825 (1.968)***
4.9914

7.771 (2.18)***
3.5655

7.272 (1.85)***
3.9404

11.563 (2.245)***
5.15

104

104

104

104

104

.1024

.3674

.0411

.3203

.1721

Number of
Observations
R²

Figures in parenthesis represent robust standard errors; italicized figures represent t-statistics; significance at
the 10, 5, and 1% levels is denoted “*,” “**,” and “***,” respectively.
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APPENDIX A

Table A1
DV: Mfg. Industry
Exchange Rate
USD/CHY
U.S.-China Trade Balance
Constant
Number of Observations
R²

Table A2
DV: Non-Mfg. Industry
Exchange Rate
USD/CHY
U.S.-China Trade Balance
Constant
Number of Observations
R²

1

2

.752 (.137)***
5.477

-------------

-------------

-6.23e^-6 (3.812)

102.343 (.887)***
115.374

106.34 (.457)***
232.9

.921 (.1669)***
5.519
8.1e^-6 (4.55)*
1.78
101.959 (.912)***
111.842

744

744

744

.039

.003

.043

1

2

3

.354 (.173)**

-------------

.588 (.217)***
2.719

9.626e^-7 (4.77e^-6)
.206
104.354 (.57)***
183

------------102.158 (1.125)***

3

1.07e^-5 (5.94e^-6)*
101.576 (1.169)***
86.926

620

620

620

.007

.00006

-.012

Table A3
DV: Mfg. anti-dumping
petitions

1

2

3

Pass-Through Elasticity

.00392 (1.0458)**
.003744

.006 (.917)*
.0065

.077 (.917)
.084

USD/CHY

-------------

.687 (.046)***
14.908

.67 (.047)***

Industry Exchange Rate

-------------

-------------

.018 (.012)
1.49

Constant

5.3506 (.3473)***
15.41

1.26 (.409)***
3.075

-.65 (1.34)
-.484

Number of Observations

739

739

739

R²

-.00136

.232

.234
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Table A4
DV: Non-mfg. antidumping petitions

1

2

3

Pass-Through Elasticity

1.06e^-12 (8.32)
.0001

-1.15e^-13 (7.2)
-.0001

-.569 (7.2)
-.079

USD/CHY

-------------

.7189 (.0489)***
14.417

.7128 (.04998)***
14.2602

Industry Exchange Rate

-------------

-------------

.0174 (.012)
1.496

Constant

5.35 (2.866)*
1.869

1.041 (2.498)
.4167

-.537 (2.709)
-.198

Number of Observations

620

620

620

R²

.0001

.252

.255

Table A5
DV: Protectionist
legislation

1

2

3

.27 (.0225)***
11.999

-------------

.1725 (.0255)***

-------------

-------------

Anti-Dumping Petitions
Trade balance
USD/CHY
Constant
Number of Observations
R²

1.552 (.145)***
10.667
620

.308 (.0336)***
9.173
1.149 (.2188)***
5.254
620

-7.81e^-6 (1.09e^-6)***
-7.176
.0136 (.0404)
.3367
1.395 (.211)***
6.597
620

.1889

.1198

.2717

-------------
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